The UK Supreme Court Rules There Is No Power To Revoke A Valid Adoption Order

6 May 2026

“Adoption is entirely a creature of statute…”

On 22 April 2026, the UK Supreme Court published its legal ruling on whether the court has power to revoke a validly made adoption order where there is no scope for an appeal, In the matter of X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside) [2026] UKSC 13. It dismissed the adoptive mother’s application that her adoption of two sisters in 2013 should be set aside on welfare grounds given the long established final and permanent status of an adoption order. This ruling has important ramifications for children, parents and families who are contemplating or have undergone adoption proceedings and sends a clear message about the lifelong nature of an adoption order.

Background

In 2012, X and Y (aged five and four years old) were placed for adoption with AM following a prolonged stay in foster care. AM was subsequently granted an adoption order in May 2013, although X and Y maintained contact with their birth mother BM with AM’s support.

In 2021, X and Y stopped living with AM and moved in with BM. The following year, 2022, X moved to live with her natural father. In doing so, the breakdown of the adoption was not the result of AM rejecting X and Y and was instead a consequence of AM supporting their wishes and feelings.

In February 2023, the local authority commenced legal proceedings and successfully applied for interim supervision orders claiming X and Y were beyond parental control. These legal proceedings concluded in May 2023 with the grant of child arrangements orders that X live with her natural father and Y live with BM. An order was also made for X to spend time with BM.

By 2026, X was living with her husband and baby. The previous year, 2025, X recommenced telephone contact with AM and met up in person. Y continued to live with BM and had no further contact with AM since leaving her care. Y also gave birth to her first child in 2025 and remained in contact with Y.

These Legal Proceedings

In April 2023, AM applied to the High Court to revoke the adoption orders under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court applicable to children. Her revocation application was made on welfare grounds with the intention of giving effect to the wishes and feelings of X and Y. Both X and Y supported the application (X was 17 and Y was 16 at the time). At first instance, Mrs Justice Lieven accepted that there was a category of case where the power to revoke a validly made adoption order existed under the inherent jurisdiction of the court but determined it could not be used solely on welfare grounds. Lieven J went on to refuse the application on the basis the court had no power to revoke the adoption orders on welfare grounds.

AM appealed asserting that the statutory scheme under the ACA 2002 could be read compatibly with her, X and Y’s human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. She relied on section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA 1998”) to give power to revoke the adoption orders or a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA 1998. As a result, the government department responsible for adoption policy intervened in the form of the Secretary of State for Education. Within the appeal proceedings, counsel for AM abandoned reliance on human rights arguments and pursued the appeal on the basis of a power exercisable by the High Court to revoke an adoption order under the inherent jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal dismissed AM’s appeal ruling that the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside a validly made adoption, whether this was under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or otherwise because the ACA 2002 is clear that an adoption order is intended to be permanent and lifelong. It went on to rule that the appropriate route to seek to set aside an adoption order, if there is an appealable error, is an application for permission to appeal out of time, where the child’s welfare could be considered. However, it went on to lay down a caveat that where an adoption has “turned out badly and that revocation would serve the interests of the adopted person, whether a child or an adult, is not a reason for the court to supply a remedy that parliament has chosen not to provide” (para 68).

AM then appealed to the UK Supreme Court, where three organisations concerned with adoption were also given permission to submit written submissions, namely: the International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice, the Association of Lawyers for Children and CoramBAAF which describes itself as the UK’s leading organisation for professionals working across adoption, fostering and kinship care.

AM’s appeal to the UK Supreme Court was based on a legal argument that the court has an “inherent parens patriae jurisdiction” to revoke a legally valid adoption order in exceptional circumstances (there being no statutory mechanism to revoke a valid adoption order).

The Statutory Adoption Scheme

The Supreme Court ruling set out that the making of an adoption order is governed by the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (“the ACA 2002”). The paramount consideration in granting an adoption order is the child’s welfare throughout their life (section 1(2) of the ACA 2002) with reference to the “welfare checklist” (section 1(4) of the ACA 2002). The Supreme Court ruling went on to explain (para 15):

“Accordingly, the statutory scheme requires a once and for all determination based on a prospective assessment of “the child’s welfare” looking forwards throughout their life (section 1(2)). The court must have regard to the likely effect on the child (throughout their life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted child (section 1(4)(c)). Moreover, as the Court of Appeal put it, the court must be satisfied that the child’s welfare requires adoption, as opposed to any other lesser arrangement available. After a full welfare evaluation of the benefits and disadvantages, undertaken in a holistic rather than linear manner, the court must consider that the highest level of intervention, namely adoption, is proportionate and necessary to meet the child’s welfare needs (section 1(6)).”

The Supreme Court further set out that the legal effect of an adoption order is transformative and treats the adopted person in law as if born as the child of the adopter/s and extinguishes the legal parentage of the natural parent/s. Furthermore, the only narrow statutory provision to revoke an adoption order is set out in section 55 of the ACA 2002. This relates to the legitimation of an adopted child (i.e. where a child adopted by one natural parent as a sole adoptive parent becomes a legitimated person upon the subsequent marriage or civil partnership by the natural parents and the court may then upon application revoke the adoption order) so as to remove any stigma of illegitimacy of the adopted child.

The Supreme Court also highlighted the strong public policy grounds for the final nature, certainty and effect of an adoption order. It cited the potential damage to the lifelong commitment of adopters to their adopted children if it was possible to subsequently challenge the validity of an adoption order and the impact this could have on prospective adopters willingness and availability.

Power Under The Parens Patriae Jurisdiction

Within the Supreme Court legal proceedings, counsel for AM asserted that in determining AM’s application to revoke the adoption orders this did not depend exclusively on welfare grounds and it should also be balanced with public policy considerations. He went on to assert that invoking the court’s inherent jurisdiction power did not cut across the ACA 2002 in circumstances where the child’s welfare needs would not otherwise be met and their identity rights not respected. As such, there was a need for the court to correct the legal fiction that had come about where BM was once again Y’s mother in practice (and possibly X) but AM remained their legal mother for all purposes and which trapped Y in an identity she had rejected.

The Supreme Court determined that this first raised an issue about whether there is an inherent jurisdiction in the High Court to set aside a legally valid adoption order and went on to determine that this power was not available. In doing so, it looked carefully at the history of the parens patriae jurisdiction which dated back to ancient powers belonging to the crown in medieval times. It meant “parent of the nation” and gave powers to look after those unable to take care of themselves, including children and those with serious cognitive or mental health difficulties. It went on to be vested in the High Court. However, it found that the parens patriae jurisdiction is limited where parliament had provided statute and cannot be used to circumvent the legislation. It now only exists as a residual power to protect those from significant harm where no other statutory mechanism is available or adequate, for example in determining medical treatment decisions for very ill children towards end of life or needing life-saving treatment or by means of making a child a ward of court. It also ruled that there is also no precedent for the use of powers under the inherent jurisdiction to change the legal parental relationship in the way sought by AM, X and Y.

The Supreme Court went on to rule that the only way of extinguishing the adopted parent’s legal parentage is by means of the grant of another adoption order (section 46(5) of the ACA 2002). As such, there is no right to re-establish the child’s original family life that was brought to an end by the adoption order and any conferral of parentage to the natural parent requires the grant of a further adoption order. It further determined that there are sufficient other powers open to the court under the Children Act 1989 to protect adopted children from harm in the event of adoption breakdown just as there are for natural children to include: conferral of parental responsibility on carers who are not legal parents, regulating or terminating contact with adoptive parents, the making of special guardianship orders and permission for adopted children to change their surnames. Furthermore, it determined that if the parens patriae jurisdiction was used to revoke an adoption order it would circumvent the statutory scheme set out in the ACA 2002.

Appeals Out Of Time Against Adoption Orders

Nevertheless, the UK Supreme Court ruled that an adoption order is not immune from legal challenge. An adoption order is open to appeal if there is an appealable error. Additionally, time for an appeal can be extended out of time (by months or even years) where there is an appealable error albeit an extension of time is not granted lightly. In doing so, regard must be had to the child’s interest since the adoption order was made. There must also be consideration of “the public interest in recognising the importance of not undermining the irrevocability of adoption orders”. Furthermore, the longer the period of time since the adoption order the harder it is likely to be to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to extend time for an appeal. In this context, the use of the court’s inherent powers is used procedurally to act in the administration of justice (not the High Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction).

Finality And Permanence Of An Adoption Order

The UK Supreme Court then proceeded to address in detail the final, permanent and irrevocable nature of an adoption order, tracing back statutory origins and language in this regard to Parliament’s enactment of the Adoption of Children Act 1926. It noted (para 108):

“Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, it is plain from the meaning of the words used that Parliament in enacting the Adoption of Children Act 1926 followed the recommendation in the Tomlin Report that “the notion of revocation is inconsistent with the notion of adoption”. Furthermore, in all subsequent Acts concerning adoption, Parliament consistently maintained this choice, subject only to the legitimation exception… not to make any provision for revocation of a validly made adoption order. If the parens patriae jurisdiction were to have been used to revoke a valid adoption order on welfare grounds, it would have cut across the statutory scheme and defeated the consistently expressed will of Parliament that the notion of revocation was inconsistent with the notion of adoption”.

The UK Supreme Court explained that the Adoption of Children Act 1949 amended the Adoption of Children Act 1926 but made no changes to the permanent and irrevocable transfer of parental rights from natural parents to adoptive parents.  The Adoption Act 1950 was a consolidating statute which maintained that statutory scheme and made no provision for the revocation of an adoption order, although it did make provision for a further adoption to be made in respect of an adopted child. The Adoption Act 1958 introduced a limited legitimation provision enabling the court to revoke an adoption order to address stigma attaching to a child where their natural parents were unmarried at the time of their birth, the child had been adopted by one of the natural parents as a sole adopter and the birth parents subsequently married. This was on the basis that the natural parents marriage legitimated the child and the child’s status might be more satisfactory on that basis than as the status of a child born to the adopter legitimately by means of an adoption order (and which required the revocation of the adoption order). In all other respects, the Adoption Act 1958 maintained the statutory scheme and the permanent and final nature of an adoption order. The Adoption Act 1976 also maintained the same statutory scheme.

The UK Supreme Court further explained that the ACA 2002 also maintained the statutory scheme and the permanency and finality of an adoption order backed by public policy considerations set out in previous reports and a White Paper presented to Parliament in December 2000 by the Secretary of State for Health called “Adoption a new approach”, which it summarised (para 126):

“(a) It will gravely damage the lifelong commitment of adopters to their adoptive children if there is a possibility of the child, the birth parents or adopters seeking to challenge the finality of an adoption order. That could lead to a public perception that adoption is reversible and a less serious undertaking than biological parenting and risks diminishing the value and importance of adoption as a means of providing a permanent family to children in care.

(b) One of the central factors relevant to the success of an adoptive placement is the stability of the adoptive family relationships and the commitment of the adoptive parents to the child.

(c) Any measure which wakens or undermines the finality and certainty of an adoption order risks deterring potential prospective adopters from seeking to adopt a child”.

The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there would be cases where the court’s prospective assessment of the welfare of the child throughout their lifetime in making an adoption order would be incorrect. This could be for a range of different reasons including: a change in character or habits of adopters or their serious misconduct towards the child. However, the adopted child’s welfare could be protected using other powers and in that sense would be in the same position as a natural child in that instance.

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no other scope for the High Court to exercise inherent powers to revoke an adoption order. It determined that no reliance could be placed on G v G (Parental Order; Revocation) [2012] EWHC 1979 (Fam); [2013] 1 FLR 286 as this related to an application by an intended father to set aside a parental order for a surrogate born child under different legislation in the form of section 54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. The Supreme Court also addressed human rights considerations set out in the HRA 1998. It ruled that the court’s duty under section 6 of the HRA 1998 operates within the confines of the court’s jurisdiction and does not extend it. It went on to rule that it considered it impossible to conceive of such an extreme situation arising that would justify the revocation of an adoption order on human rights grounds.

Specialist Family & Children Law